

Corporate Social Responsibility and the “Divided Corporate Self”: The case of Chiquita in Colombia

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ABSTRACT. This article employs Maak’s framework of the seven “Cs” of Corporate Integrity to assess the problems faced by Chiquita Brands in dealing with extortion by left-wing guerilla and right wing paramilitary groups in Colombia from 1989 to 2004. Both types of organizations used Chiquita payments to engage in terrorist activity in Colombia. The extended and systematic dealings with these groups were antithetical to the process of corporate responsibility to which the firm was committed during the timeframe of 1998–2004, revealing a “divided self” in which major corporate activities diverged dramatically from the core values of the firm. Maak’s framework provides a useful tool in analyzing the

division and the potential for applying lessons from the case to our understanding of corporate social responsibility.

KEY WORDS: corporate integrity, corporate social responsibility, corporate responsibility, Chiquita, Colombia

Introduction

Over the past 20 years of business ethics scholarship, a robust literature has developed around the domain of corporate integrity, drawing from thought on integrity as a philosophical construct (Calhoun, 1995; McFall, 1987), and as a human virtue (Audi and Murphy, 2006; Becker 1998; Brown, 2005; Petrick and Quinn, 2001) or cluster of virtues (Solomon, 1993) and extrapolating to the corporate organizational context (Brown, 2005; Koehn, 2005; Srivastva et al., 1988; Solomon, 1999) and the processes of organizational management (Garriga and Mele, 2004; Kaptein and Wempe, 2002; Mayer, 2001; Paine, 1994; Wempe, 2008). Most recently, Maak (2008) supports the construct of Corporate Integrity as a useful “sense-making framework” (Maak, 2008, p. 365) that connects the various research domains of corporate social responsibility (CSR), business ethics, stakeholder theory, sustainability, and citizenship in a sensible and workable way. The approach, he argues, avoids a “piecemeal approach in matters of ‘CSR,’ or corporate responsibility” and, he proposes, better “align[s] the various integrity requirements and [integrates] issues and levels, [making] corporations ... much better equipped to meet all and not just some of the ethics challenges and thus to act responsibly” (Maak, 2008,

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p. 365). Finally, Maak identifies the notion of an “undivided corporate self” as product of and necessary condition for Corporate Integrity, and describes seven analytically distinct aspects of Corporate Integrity that he calls the “7Cs”: Commitment, Conduct, Content, Context, Consistency, Coherence, and Continuity.

This article presents the recent history of Chiquita Brands’ program of CSR to examine the efficacy of using Maak’s seven elements to explain the nature of Chiquita’s ethical and business problem with terrorist demands on its Colombian banana plantation. The article explicates the facts, such as they are available from public sources, of Chiquita’s recent history in Colombia, and juxtaposes these facts to what we know of the firm’s authentic commitment to corporate responsibility. Major corporate activities diverged dramatically from the core values of the firm. Maak’s “divided self” crystallizes these events and provides a working metaphor for making sense of the divergent happenings in Cincinnati and Colombia. Next, the article navigates Maak’s “7Cs” of integrity as an organizing device for identifying and understanding what might have gone wrong at Chiquita. The resulting analysis provides insights and possible lessons to be learned from the discontinuity of the corporate self at Chiquita. In addition, it suggests possible expansions of Maak’s framework.

Chiquita in Cincinnati

In 1998, the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, allegedly in breach of confidentiality agreements, published articles about Chiquita Brands, Inc. that amounted to a scathing indictment of its environmental and human rights record, especially in the fruit-growing areas of Latin America, and particularly Costa Rica.¹ Soon after these articles appeared, Chiquita top management commenced a comprehensive review of corporate values and processes, led by its new CEO Steve Warshaw and a Senior Management Group for Corporate Responsibility. In 2003, Werre, who worked with Chiquita as a consultant, documented the process by which Chiquita’s top management undertook an intensive and broad revisioning and implementation of firm’s values and behavior, with the goal of becoming the industry leader in Cor-

porate Responsibility (CR). After a year of consensus-seeking processes within the firm, including contributions from more than 1000 employees, Chiquita articulated its four Core Values: Integrity, Respect, Opportunity, and Responsibility. These values, with a clear and brief explanation of each, were branded and distributed as posters and wallet cards to all employees. Notably, under the core value “Responsibility,” the company included: “We act responsibly in the communities and environments in which we live and work” (Werre, 2003, p. 254).

Implementation did not stop there. Chiquita created a senior officer for CR, created a comprehensive Code of Conduct consistent with Social Accountability standard 8000, and launched a training program and English and Spanish language literature to “mak[e] the vision and core values come to life for each employee” (Werre, 2003, p. 255). The Code of Conduct became specific “in the areas of food safety, labour standards, employee health and safety, community involvement, environmental protection, ethical behavior, and legal compliance” (Werre, 2003, p. 255). In addition, the Audit Committee of the board was charged with oversight of the CR program and an independent auditing firm hired to conduct audits of Chiquita’s compliance with SA 8000. In 2002, the CR Vision and Core Values became part of the company’s strategic plan, and CR was made one of Chiquita’s five long-term strategic goals.

By 2002, Chiquita had made demonstrable progress in reducing accidents, improving worker safety and health, improving industrial relations, reducing the use of pesticides, recycling plastics, planting trees, and according comprehensive attention to sustainable production and distribution practices. The efforts brought accolades to the firm, reduced insurance costs, and attracted a greater number and range of retail purchasers. Finally, Chiquita began an annual Corporate Social Responsibility report that is well regarded in the CSR community for its commitment to transparency and sustainability. By 2003, Chiquita’s environmental sustainability program was recertified by the Rainforest Alliance, and all Social Accountability 8000 labor standards had been met in Costa Rica. These efforts appear to continue into 2009, with regular CR reports and documentation and transparency of the CR program. Chiquita has continued to make strides in recycling, reduction of

pesticide use, working conditions, and containing environmental externalities.

Chiquita in Colombia²

During the period that Chiquita’s leadership was making impressive efforts to implement CSR, Chiquita knowingly and intentionally engaged in action puzzlingly antithetical to its Core Values: From 1989 to 2004 (at least), it provided financial support and weapon delivery to various guerilla and paramilitary organizations in Colombia. These organizations used the support to slaughter one another as well as hundreds of civilians, including Chiquita workers and American missionaries, all with the intention of establishing control over areas of Colombia that the national government could not control. These payments stopped for good in 2004, not as a result of the CSR process but as a result of possible criminal prosecution in the United States under the anti-terrorism laws.

Colombia has been in conflict amounting to a civil war for decades. Organizations of the extreme right and extreme left have fought one another and the national government over control and power, financing their hostilities with money extorted from the illegal drug industry and from legal businesses such as Chiquita and other multinationals. At any point in recent years, the democratically elected Colombian government has been unable to control large areas of the country, and throughout the relevant time period, the Colombian government did not control the region in which Chiquita grew bananas. Although its predecessor firm, United Fruit later known as United Brands, started exporting bananas from Colombia in 1899, the firm had left war-torn Colombia in 1982, largely because of the war.

When it re-entered Colombia in 1989, Chiquita found it necessary to pay protection money to two organizations, FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and National Liberation Army (ELN), to secure the safety of its workers from attacks. Both organizations were known for ruthless massacres of one another and of civilian non-combatants, and so the threat of violence was real; these acts continued during the time Chiquita made payments to FARC and ELN. For example, in 1993, five American missionaries were brutally murdered by FARC. In

1995, FARC murdered 28 Chiquita employees while the workers were on a bus on their way to work.

In the mid-1990s, the Colombian government formed Convivir, a private security group, to combat FARC. Convivir was only partly successful in this objective and became, instead, a front for filtering payments to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a government backed paramilitary organization intended to drive FARC out of the region. By 1997, however, AUC had turned rogue and out of the control of the Colombian government. And similar to FARC, AUC engaged in brutal massacres to control the area where Chiquita operated.

Meanwhile, on October 8, 1997, the US Department of State placed FARC and ELN on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) official list, making it a federal crime to provide payments of any sort to these organizations or otherwise conduct business with them. Chiquita stopped payments immediately, but it struck a deal with Carlos Cantano, the leader of AUC, for protection. AUC used the funds and other support to gain control of the area. Between 1997 and 2003, when Chiquita ceased payments to AUC, AUC accounted for the deaths of more than a hundred non-combatants, including Chiquita workers. In 1998, it forced Chiquita employees to watch the murder of two co-workers. In 1999, two AUC members entered the Chiquita plantation on a motorcycle, watched patiently while work commenced for the morning, then, pulled a banana picker out of a tree and beheaded him with a machete. Then, they remounted the motorcycle and rode off. DiPerna recounts another atrocity in January 2001 involving AUC entering a small farming village, “round[ing] up all of the male civilians, and smash[ing] their skulls with stones and sledgehammers” (DiPerna, 2008).

On September 10, 2001, the US Department of State added AUC to the FTO list. This detail went unnoticed at Chiquita in the wake of two other major events: the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center bombing and Chiquita’s chapter 11 bankruptcy. Chiquita claims that no one in the Chiquita organization, including the Office of General Counsel, noticed AUC on the FTO list until February 20, 2003, and neither the Department of Justice nor the Chiquita board of directors’ Special Litigation Committee has provided any reason to

disbelieve this claim. On April 3, 2003, its General Counsel Robert Olson took this information to the Audit Committee of the board, a delay for which he has been criticized. In November 2001, meanwhile, after AUC went on the FTO list, a Chiquita subsidiary smuggled several thousand AK-47s, arms, and associated munitions into Colombia from Panama for AUC and other paramilitary groups as part of a “cocaine for weapons” exchange (DiPerna, 2008).

In March 2002, Roderick Hills joined the Chiquita Board of Directors as head of the Audit Committee. Hills is a highly respected US corporate lawyer with experience both as White House counsel and as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the 1970s, he had led the US government’s efforts to combat bribery by the US multinationals of foreign governments. Appointing Hills was a fortuitous move by Chiquita, perhaps, one hopes, inspired by its newly found commitment to CR and by its emergence from bankruptcy.

In any event, probably no Audit Committee chair could have been better positioned than Hills to recognize Chiquita’s problem when, in February 2003, he learned of the illegality of the payments to AUC. Public sources, including court documents filed by Chiquita, report that Chiquita’s General Counsel, Robert Olson, had already sought outside legal opinion from Kirkland and Ellis on the matter, which firmly established the illegal aspect of the payments program. The fact of the payments, however, had not been hidden. Top management, the Audit Committee, and the Board of Directors were aware of the underlying facts, *though not their illegality under US law after September 2001*, for approximately 18 months. By at least April 2002, the payments were known to the post-bankruptcy board of directors and had been disclosed to Ernst and Young, the firm’s auditors. They appeared on Chiquita’s SEC filings and reports to shareholders, and, presumably, they were deducted as a business expense. Chiquita maintained that the payments were legal under Colombian law because they were extorted, and that they did not violate the United States law because they were properly reported to shareholders.

The Chiquita Board of Directors was apprised of the status of AUC on the FTO at its meeting on April 3, 2003. At that time, Chiquita had more than 4000 employees in Colombia and had made payments to AUC of about \$1.7M over a 7-year period,

some of them in the period since September 2001. The board was understandably reluctant to cease payments precipitously and place these workers, as well as the profitability of the operation, at risk of an almost certain end. The board asked Hills, as head of the Audit Committee, to report the payments and disclose the facts to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). Hills met with Michael Chertoff, head of the DOJ criminal division, and others, on April 24, 2003. During the meeting, there develops significant disagreement about exactly what was said and what was understood by the parties; they agree, however, that Chertoff affirmed that, in his view, the payments violated federal criminal law. Conversations continued between Chiquita and the DOJ, and public sources report that by September 8, 2003, Chiquita’s outside counsel, Kirkland & Ellis, reported to Chiquita that the DOJ viewed the payments as a violation of law it could not endorse. In the meantime, in May 2003, Chiquita had resumed the payments.

In January 2004, Chiquita ceased payments and sold its operating subsidiary in Colombia to Colombian interests for \$51.1M, some of which was cash, some deferred payments, and some assumption of pension obligations. The agreement stipulated that the acquiring entity would continue Chiquita’s environmental and labor standards, and it was accompanied by a contract for the continued purchase of bananas from the acquiring entity.

The matter did not end there. The DOJ continued investigation and, on March 14, 2007, filed criminal charges against Chiquita under the U.S. anti-terrorist law. The next day, Chiquita settled its charges with the government by pleading guilty to a charge of Engaging in Transactions with a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (18 U.S. Sect. 1705(b)) and agreeing to a \$25 million fine. The government declined to press charges against individual managers or board members, although that threat hung over their heads for several years. As a result of these admissions, the Colombian prosecutor sought extradition – from the USA – of top corporate managers in Cincinnati to face criminal charges in Colombia, a demand which apparently has been dropped. In addition, Chiquita has been sued in the USA under the Alien Tort Claims Act and other US law for civil claims totaling nearly \$8 billion by victims and families of victims of the AUC violence.

These claims are still pending. In addition, between October 12, 2007 and January 15, 2008, Chiquita shareholders filed six derivative suits in state and federal courts against officers and directors of the company. In April, 2008, the federal cases were consolidated and transferred to the federal court for the Southern District of Florida. Also in April 2008, the Chiquita board of directors appointed a Special Litigation Committee composed of outside directors; in February 2009, the Committee filed its report in the Florida federal court in support of a motion to dismiss the consolidated shareholder derivative suit. This report is remarkably forthcoming about the facts and the thoughts at sequential decision points between 1987 and 2004 (Barker et al., 2009).

Chiquita: the divided self

The inner cynic asks: Was CR simply window dressing for Chiquita, or is there more to be gleaned from the tale about the nature of CSR? It is easy to be cynical, but there is substantial evidence that Chiquita top management, in fact, took the development of its CR program seriously and did not regard it as window dressing. While this author is not privy to thought processes within Chiquita management, it seems reasonable to assume that, on the one hand, senior managers were attending carefully and in good faith to the CR program, and on the other, not connecting the dots between continuing to support terrorist activities in the region and the firm’s espoused core values, such as the one of “act[ing] responsibly in the communities and environments in which we live and work.” One can operate a model banana plantation in terms of labor relations, sanitation, and environmental responsibility, but if one is directly facilitating the murder of dozens or even hundreds of innocent persons in the community, then those laudable practices fade in moral significance.

One asks, then, where was the moral coherence, the integrity of the disparate decisions? How did Chiquita find itself in this situation? Were the dissonant decisions a result of compartmentalized analyses, so that the relationship of one to the other remained obscure? Was it a matter of failing to recognize an inherent ethical problem when making

a “seemingly unimportant decision”?³ How did Chiquita’s corporate self become so divided as to threaten its corporate integrity? Here, Maak’s analytical framework proves useful; it identifies seven distinct elements of corporate integrity, each of which focuses on a particular aspect of the overarching virtue and permits the analyst to make sense of the facts by the elements of corporate integrity involved. These elements are: (1) Commitment; (2) Conduct; (3) Content; (4) Context; (5) Consistency; (6) Coherence; and (7) Continuity.

Commitment

The first element in Maak’s analytical scheme involves commitment to a “worthwhile purpose,” one “aligned to the basic moral principles of society and basic human rights more generally” (Maak, 2008, p. 362). Through the CR process Werre describes, Chiquita top management committed itself to “right” principles. The Core Values emerged from, and were responsive to, a broad consensus of stakeholders – employees, international labor organizations, and environmental/sustainability NGOs, among others – to assure alignment with basic moral principles. And Chiquita put money behind its commitments and submitted to external audit and oversight. It seems obvious, in retrospect, that Chiquita was committed to too narrow a scope of human rights issues, for it ignored the human rights of innocent Colombians deeply and directly affected by its decision to pay the guerillas and paramilitary groups. Was the CR process geared to respond to specific criticisms and external interest groups, or did the process involve an unintentionally bounded vision of human rights?

One must consider also that a core value of “providing appropriate returns to our shareholders” (Werre, 2003, p. 255) trumped the value of acting responsibly in communities. One may argue that the support to the guerillas and paramilitary groups was a necessary means to producing shareholder return. However, if one likens this reasoning to that which multinationals have employed to justify bribing foreign government officials, the fallacy seems obvious. The primacy of shareholder value, even in the most traditional capitalist framework, requires that a firm operate within the boundaries of law and ethics. While Chiquita’s claim of extortion might or might not be a defense to bribery in

Colombian law, it is unlikely that systematically and knowingly providing material support to violent anti-government forces meets standards of Colombian law. It may well be true that Chiquita could not make money from growing bananas in Colombia without regularly and systematically financing organizations that often amounted to death squads. It is also likely that other multinationals, both the US and international, were doing, or would do, the same thing. That does not justify the action morally. It does, however, suggest the critical role of law and international cooperation when multinational corporations must address demands for political involvement of a violent nature when operating internationally, especially in politically unstable places. Multinationals need a common framework, a more level playing field, if they are to adhere successfully to consistent moral and legal standards in this area, much as they need the common framework of international law and treaties in the area of foreign government bribery. Our colleague, Thomas Dunfee, in whose honor this issue is dedicated, might even entertain a ban on multinationals' financing of political violence as a candidate for hypernorm status (Dunfee, 1999, 2000, 2006). Indeed, the possibility of a hypernorm limiting political engagement in unstable and violent political realms requires independent exploration.

Conduct

Maak speaks of "integrity management," which he describes as the "thorough and systematic endeavors to find and close possible loopholes – integrity gaps – that could endanger the integrity of the corporation" (Maak, 2008, p. 362). Chiquita appears to have suffered a gaping "integrity gap" in that organizational systems, processes, and decision makers missed the disconnect between the CR program and the payments. Perhaps, decision makers perceived a moral distinction between bribery and extortion, the one being a cost-saving way of getting something to which one is not entitled and the other being a costly (in this case) way of avoiding a moral wrong. As we know, however, bribery and extortion are two sides of the same coin, reflecting primarily a power imbalance: Taken as a whole, the transaction is damaging to the common good and, at base, it is consensual when carried out over time. Eventually, a firm can no longer claim victim status; it becomes a

dependable and active participant. It is also possible that these questions did not occur to top management, that the expediency of the matter, together with a long history of similar activity in Latin America, and so compartmentalized the decision that its moral significance and risk was obscured.

Content and context

The element of content focuses on the *what* that a company does, while the element of context focuses on "relational wholeness," or "sound relating, as well as being consciously embedded in one's whole range of relationships: internally, externally, and with societies at large" (Maak, 2008, p. 363). Another way to frame the matter is in terms of what conduct would an "integrated corporate self" have engaged in the context in which the firm operated in Colombia? One suspects a critical cognitive error at the highest levels of the firm in bifurcating the security problem between the laudable goal of providing worker safety and the wholly unlaudable result of doing so in the manner it felt forced to employ. Undoubtedly, doing business in unstable political environments is fraught with peril, and requires more than a good intention. And Chiquita faced the deeper problem of doing business in a country whose national government was unable to exercise political control over the relevant territory. As Cahn and Gambino observe, "We can jump up and down about transparency and CSR, but, unless the governments ... are responsible, then we're just pasting band-aids on the problem that won't stick for very long" (Cahn and Gambino, 2008).

One can see Chiquita's relationship with FARC and UNL and AUC as an attempt to secure a more or less reliable source of order, however primitive and however unorthodox. Indeed, the relationships were motivated by a need to protect the lives of its workers. This observation underscores the primacy of the rule of law, as a matter of stability and safety. Chiquita faced a very difficult problem. What were its alternatives? Could it provide its own security by hiring its own mercenaries, or would this result in further destabilization of a democratic country (and an ally of the USA), as well as add to the country one more paramilitary group with the potential to turn rogue? Could it engage non-Colombian security forces, and, if so, could these forces protect workers both at work and in the villages where they and their

families lived? Clearly, there was no good alternative. On the contrary, did anyone foresee the risk of Cincinnati executives ending up in the US federal prison, or probably worse, in Colombian prisons? Or the risk of Chiquita being held responsible legally, under the law of an efficacious government (the USA), for the miserable deaths of Colombians and Americans killed with weapons and money Chiquita knowingly provided? One asks the age-old question, “At what price profits?,” and the answer seems obvious: Sometimes, the potential profit is not worth the risks of being morally responsible for atrocious wrongs. A good decision required prescience and foresight from the outset, in 1989. Over time, the problem compounded until it became unmanageable.

One may observe another nuance of context: CR initiatives must be motivated by greater concerns than criticism by investigative reporters or leadership by NGOs with a laudable, though specific, agenda, and they must be measured by more pervasive standards than compliance with the international standards of NGOs, as helpful as these may be. CR has to be a pervasive strategy, because societies, including both the home society and the host society, will, in fact, hold corporations responsible eventually, in some forum, if at all possible. It is essential to grasp fully the economic and political and legal implications of long-term decisions in the particular context in which they will play out.

Consistency

The element of consistency looks at the effect on perceived authenticity when words do not match deeds. It is, as Maak describes, the alignment of word and deed. Obviously, this is the essential problem presented by the Chiquita fact situation. There is another level at which the consistency of word and deed diverge: One suspects that the CR program was largely driven exogenously, but it is also evident that the process of coming clean on funding terrorist activity was also so driven. In both cases, word and deed diverged. Chiquita’s payments, as well as the associated facilitation of murder and brutality, may or may not have been illegal under Colombian law, but they did not cease until the threat of action by the United States became quite real. In 2001 and 2002, any US multinational corporation could have recognized the wrongfulness of financing international

terrorists, and the collateral damage to innocent people that terrorism entails. Yet, it was not until the wrong was known to be *technically illegal* under the law of a powerful and effective government that it ceased. This observation underscores not only the importance of the rule of law in supporting a moral and just society, but also the importance of a moral and just society possessing the will to use the significant power of the state to apprehend and punish actions that damage the common good. In addition, it suggests that this element of consistency has multiple meanings and implications and perhaps could be refined to distinguish between the affirmative value of consistency and the critical weight that consistency over time may pose to positive reform.

Coherence

Coherence involves sticking to stated principles, so that one can see the principles in the code of conduct and the value and mission statement of the organization, and then observe corporate action and conduct aligned with these stated principles. Maak refers to the Johnson and Johnson Tylenol case as a classic example of coherence between the corporate priority of putting the health and safety of customers first (and profits last) and the act of pulling product from shelves as widely as it did. Attention to this element frames the fundamental disconnect between Chiquita’s espoused goal of acting “responsibly in the communities and environments in which we live and work” and its conduct toward that end.

Continuity

This element looks at the consistency of action over time. Sadly, funding the guerillas and paramilitary groups appears more continuous with the history of 100+ Chiquita and its predecessor organizations in Latin America than it does with the principles that flowed out of the CR process. It is not easy to change corporate culture and implicit corporate understanding of how a firm does business. The long-standing habit of devaluing and disregarding the law and human welfare of the host country, of involving itself in the politics of the host country in violent ways, is well documented. Chiquita’s management had a serious challenge in seeking to alter the course of firm history, and they should be lauded for undertaking in good faith to do so. One hopes they will continue to do so. However, the path is not easy.

Many of my students, after looking at the information available from public sources and recognizing that we may never know all of the relevant facts in the situation, converge on the idea that Chiquita's problems began in 1989, when it decided to return to Colombia and pay FARC for protection. Once a company's willingness to pay extortion is known, there is no end to the number of organizations who may spring up sequentially to fight and kill for the payments. Similar to many tough problems in international business – including bribery and payments extorted through executive kidnappings – the corporate approach must be carefully and holistically understood and implemented, and it must be continuous through time.

Conclusion

At base, the facts of Chiquita's experience in Colombia challenge the very integrity of the corporation. Maak's concept of the "divided corporate self" well frames the disparate decisions in which Chiquita Brands' top management and directors engaged. Understanding the distinct elements of Corporate Integrity, as Maak breaks them down, provides a useful analytical framework, a dissection tool if you will, for discussion on how matters went wrong. Whether it would serve to be so useful in prospective decision making is not tested by this article; arguably, incorporating elements of hyper-norm theory might enrich Maak's framework for decision making, and that should be explored. Chiquita did some things right; it was the failure to incorporate a fully integrated approach to corporate responsibility that made possible such disparate corporate decisions. Had it done so, Chiquita might have managed the problems it faced in Colombia more effectively.

It is still unclear whether Chiquita's ultimate solution – to sell the subsidiary but continue buying bananas from it – does more than place an intermediary between the firm and the violence. This strategy may or may not provide legal shelter, but it does not solve the moral and ethical problem: Chiquita still bears responsibility for continued violence funded by its payments to the new owner, and it should treat that responsibility through contract and monitoring source of product in much

the same way that as it did while contracting responsibly for its workers and for environmental concerns.

Notes

¹ Mike Gallagher and Cameron McWhirter, collection of articles that appeared in the Cincinnati Enquirer, May 3, 1998, accessible at <http://www.mindfully.org/Pesticide/chiquita/chiquita14.htm>.

² The story presented in this section reflects information summarized from the following public sourced news articles: Kevin Gray, "The Banana War," *Conde Nast Portfolio* October 17, 2007 accessed 12/18/2008 at <http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/international-news/portfolio/2007/09/17/Chiquita-death-squads>; George Quraishi, "Peeling the Banana," *Conde Nast Portfolio* May 13, 2008 accessed 12/18/2008 at <http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/daily-brief/2008/05/13/peeling-the-banana>; "Chiquita to Plead Guilty to Ties with Terrorists", CNNMoney.com, March 14, accessible at <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17688439/>; The Associated Press, "Chiquita Pleads Guilty in Terrorism Probe," March 19, 2007; The Associated Press, "Chiquita Admits to Paying Terrorists," March 15, 2007; The Associated Press, "Chiquita Charged in Terror Investigation," March 14, 2007; FoxNews.com, "Colombians Sue Chiquita Brands for Making payments to Terror Group," November 14, 2007; Nicholas Stein, "Yes, We Have No Profits," *Fortune Magazine*, November 26, 2001; Eoin O'Carroll, "Colombia Seeks Eight in Chiquita Terrorist Scandal," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 22, 2007; Sonja Sherwood, "Chiquita's Top Banana," *The Chief Executive*, June 2002; CNN.com, "Chiquita Cleans Up Its Act," October 2, 2006; Michael Evans, "'Para-politics' Goes Bananas," *The Nation*, April 4, 2007; GlobalSecurity.Org, "United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)"; Jennifer Alsever, "Chiquita Cleans Up Its Act," *Fortune Magazine*, November 17, 2006; Reuters, "Chiquita Sued in NY Over Killings in Colombia," Reuters, November 15, 2007; Cary O'Reilly, "Chiquita Brand Sued by Families of Murder Victims (Update 2) Bloomberg.com, June 7, 2008; Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Chiquita Case Puts Big Firms on Notice," *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 11, 2007; Dan Kovalik, "Obama's AG Pick Defended Chiquita in Death Squad Case," *The Huffington Post*, November 19, 2008.

³ The author credits Mr. Patrick Kuhse, who speaks extensively in many major business schools, with this insightful phrase.

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